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A B S T R A C T
We analyze the relationship between corporate dividend policy and firm lifecycle in a low-dis-
closure regime, where domestic firms have an incentive to use dividends to build capital market
reputation among external investors. We use a range of lifecycle indicators from the extant lit-
erature and find that, as predicted by the lifecycle model, dividend payouts increase along the
lifecycle until peaking in the mature stage. Furthermore, dividends are positively related to
growth opportunities. In all lifecycle stages, firms with relatively larger growth opportunities pay
relatively larger dividends. We find that firms in low-disclosure regimes, engage in reputation-
building behaviour, not just in the early stages of their lifecycle but also in the mature stage.
1. Introduction
The lifecycle model of dividends postulates that a firm's dividend payout policy is a function of their lifecycle stage. Early
empirical studies of dividend policy, though not explicitly focusing on the lifecycle model, identified key characteristics of dividend-
paying firms that are consistent with the prediction of the lifecycle model. For example, studies by Fama and French (2001) and
Grullon et al. (2005) offer indirect support for this model as they find dividend initiators exhibit mature tendencies; they are large,
profitable, and have positive free cash flow for distribution to shareholders. Furthermore, Brockman and Unlu (2009) show that
dividend-paying growth firms pay smaller dividends compared to dividend-paying mature firms.
DeAngelo et al. (2006) explicitly test the dividend-lifecycle relationship by employing a single lifecycle measure, namely the ratio
of retained to total equity, RE/TE. They argue that as firms mature this ratio increases for two reasons. First, as firms grow and
become profitable RE increases. Second, their reliance on contributed equity falls as their investment opportunity set diminishes, and
this coupled with growing profitability means that firms can substitute retained for external equity. Based on a sample of U.S. firms,
DeAngelo et al. (2006) present empirical evidence that corporate dividend payouts follow a distinct lifecycle pattern, with a positive
monotonic relationship between RE/TE and the likelihood of paying a dividend. Mature firms with large RE/TE are most likely to pay
a dividend. Subsequent studies show that this also applies to other developed markets (Denis and Osobov, 2008); and to the dividend
amount and not just to the likelihood of paying a dividend (Brockman and Unlu, 2009).
A connected strand of literature relates corporate dividend policy to country-level institutions and disclosure standards. Beck et al.
(2006) show that country-level institutional development is inversely related to financing obstacles, prompting firms to implement
their own strategies to overcome these obstacles. Brockman and Unlu (2011) test the lifecycle-inclusive disclosure standards versions
of the agency outcome and substitution models of dividends (La Porta et al., 2000) and find that the ‘dividend-payout-disclosure
standards’ relationship is u-shaped. The probability of paying a dividend is highest when disclosure standards are either weak or
strong. Where disclosure standards are weak, the costs of debt and equity capital are often prohibitively high (see Botosan, 1997; and
Sengupta, 1998 for the link between disclosure quality and the cost of capital). In such countries, growth firms respond by
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establishing a history of paying large dividends to foster trust with outside investors and build capital market reputation.1 This
reduces financing constraints and allows them to grow (Gan et al., 2013).2 Where disclosure standards are strong, the cost of capital is
lower implying that firms have less need to engage in reputation-building strategies. Therefore, we should not be surprised that the
lifecycle model of dividends receives empirical support in countries with high disclosure standards, e.g. DeAngelo et al. (2006) and
Denis and Osobov (2008) among others. Interestingly, Brockman and Unlu (2011) report similar findings for low-disclosure regimes.
They find that the likelihood of paying a dividend increases with RE/TE but do not address the issue of whether or not the dividend
amount varies over the firm lifecycle. Shao et al. (2013) show that RE/TE is positively and statistically significantly related to being a
dividend payer but statistically indistinguishable from zero using dividends-to-sales (the dividend amount), in countries where
creditor rights are weak. It remains an unanswered question if the magnitude of dividends differs between mature and growth firms
in countries with low-disclosure requirements, where dividends may be used to establish capital market reputation. Arguably it is the
size of the dividend that provides the strongest signal of a firm's intent to protect prospective shareholders, thus incentivising firms
with greater growth potential to pay larger dividends.3
In this paper, we build on these two strands of the literature to address two issues. Firstly, we test the lifecycle model of dividends
using data from Korea, a country with low-disclosure standards relative to developed markets, focusing on both the likelihood of
paying a dividend and the dividend amount. Secondly, we try to reconcile the dividend-lifecycle relationship with the reputation-
building strategies pursued by firms in countries with weak institutions. Ignoring reputation-building motives, the extant literature
suggests that mature companies pay larger dividends than growth companies. However, where these motives are strong, early-stage
firms may potentially pay comparable or larger dividends than their more-established counterparts. In addition to the RE/TE ratio,
we employ a range of lifecycle measures such as firm age, size- and industry-adjusted age, multiclass linear discriminant analysis, and
the composite proxy developed by Dickinson (2011). To the best of our knowledge, no study of the lifecycle model of dividends to
date has used this wide range of lifecycle indicators. Using more than one lifecycle proxy ensures that our findings are not driven by
one specific lifecycle measure and allows us to assess the interpretation of some of these measures in a low-disclosure regime.
Korea, over our sample period, provides an ideal setting in which to test the lifecycle model of dividends given the potential
interaction of corporate dividend policy and reputation-building strategies in this newly liberalised financial market.4 Though Korea
officially opened up its stock market to foreign investors in 1992, restrictive ownership limits of 3% for an individual and 10% for
aggregate foreign holding were initially applied. These restrictions were gradually unwound and finally abolished in May 1998.
Foreign ownership grew substantially over our sample period. In 1996, 11.5% of outstanding shares were in foreign ownership and
these accounted for 13% of market capitalisation and by the sample end of 2004, the corresponding numbers were 22% and 42%
respectively (Kim and Yi, 2015; Table 2).
Operating within a newly-liberalised and emerging market, indigenous firms had a strong incentive to engage in reputation-
building strategies to reassure foreign investors as to their commitment to protect minority stakeholders and to overcome country-
level barriers to investment. As a country, Korea has relatively low-disclosure standards. Its score of 68 places it in the bottom
tercile of the CIFAR disclosure distribution.5 Furthermore, Korea's civil law origin provides relatively weak protection of minority
shareholders with La Porta et al. (1998) showing that its Rule of Law and Efficiency of Judicial System scores (5.35 and 6 re-
spectively) are well below the average for common-law countries (6.46 and 8.15 respectively) and far removed from the U.S.
market (who scores 10 on each measure). However, Korean firms appear to invest relatively little in voluntary programs aimed at
boosting their corporate governance (see for example, Black et al., 2014),6 opening up the possibility that Korean firms may use
alternative bonding mechanisms (e.g. large dividend payouts) and/or combine dividends with governance to build reputation
capital (see John et al., 2015).
Our results produce a number of interesting findings. Firstly, Korean firms engage in reputation-building behaviour. Firms with
relatively larger growth opportunities tend to pay larger dividends, in contrast to the findings for firms in more developed, high-
disclosure regimes. Secondly, reputation building through dividend payout policy is not the sole preserve of early-stage firms, but is
also a characteristic of mature firms. Mature firms with relatively higher growth opportunities continue to pay higher dividends to
signal to potential investors that they are committed to protecting external providers of capital. Overall, the evidence is consistent
with the predictions of the lifecycle model of dividends, with dividends increasing over the lifecycle and peaking during the mature
stage. This story emerges due to both growth- and mature-stage firms pursuing reputation-building strategies.
1 Using dividend payouts to build external financing capacity is also highlighted by Masters et al. (2016). Using a sample of publicly-traded U.S. firms, they show
that contrary to conventional wisdom, financially constrained firms pay dividends, and increase their dividend immediately prior to a SEO announcement.
2 The notion that firms can build capital market reputation using dividend payout is not new. Campbell and Turner (2011) find evidence in support of the agency
substitution model of dividends in Victorian Britain.
3 Using large dividends to build reputation involves a trade-off for corporate insiders. Since expropriation risk is higher in countries with weak legal protection/
disclosure standards, insiders forgo large private gains by paying large dividends rather than retaining the funds. However, if this form of reputation building is
effective in reducing firm-level financing constraints, corporate insiders gain as the value of their (legal) cash flow rights increases as firms fund growth opportunities.
Outside investors are prepared to fund these growth opportunities as the dividend signal is deemed both costly (for insiders) and credible. The larger the dividend the
more costly it is for corporate insiders, hence the larger the signal sent to outside investors. Doidge et al. (2004) model this trade-off for firms who cross-list in the U.S.
and use Level 2/3 ADRs (or an ordinary listing) as a bonding device.
4 Korea has been the focus of a number of influential single-country studies due to the quality of the data available (Black et al., 2006); and the variation of firm
governance and business structures within the country (Baek et al., 2004; Bae and Goyal, 2010).
5 The CIFAR disclosure index captures the accounting disclosure standards in a given country by examining annual reports for the inclusion or exclusion of 85 key
items.
6 Doidge et al. (2007) show that firms with seemingly large incentives to undertake firm-specific improvements in governance may choose not to do so where
financial and/or economic development is weak.
T. Flavin, T. O'Connor Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 46 (2017) 177–190
178
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our four lifecycle proxies and contains a description of the data. Section 3
presents our empirical methodology and discusses our results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Lifecycle proxies and other data
2.1. Lifecycle proxies
There are many lifecycle proxies proposed in the extant literature. Recent work suggests lifecycle proxies can conflict with one
another (Von Eije and Megginson, 2008; and Banyi and Kahle, 2014), implying that reliance on a single lifecycle proxy is potentially
problematic and/or existing proxies may be open to alternative interpretations. We use four lifecycle proxy measures. First, following
DeAngelo et al. (2006), we use the ratio of retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE) (or assets, RE/TA), where total equity (TE) is the
sum of retained (RE) and contributed equity. The underlying premise is that young firms have little or no retained equity and rely on
contributed (external) equity, resulting in low RE/TE ratios. In contrast, mature firms with positive net cash inflows from operations
coupled with a diminishing investment opportunity set have greater access to internal funds (retained equity) and less need for
contributed equity. Hence, mature firms are expected to have large RE/TE ratios.
Second, we employ the lifecycle proxy of Dickinson (2011). It classifies firms into one of five lifecycle stages, namely introduction
(birth), growth, maturity, shake-out and decline based on the combined signs of net cash flows from operating, financing, and
investing activities. Net cash flows can be positive or negative, resulting in eight possible cash flow combinations.7 Firm classification
is grounded in economic theory. For example, firms in the introductory stage invest more than they divest, spend more cash than they
can generate internally, and issue more capital than they retire/repurchase, resulting in negative net cash flows from investments and
operations, and a positive net cash flow from financing. In our empirical application, we follow Faff et al. (2016) in combining the
shake-out and decline stages.
Third, we use the multiclass linear discriminant analysis (MLDA) of Faff et al. (2016), to classify firms into one of four lifecycle
stages. This approach initially follows Dickinson (2011) to allocate firms to a lifecycle stage but then refines the classification by
performing linear discriminant analysis, such as:
= + + + + +Group α α AGE α RE TE α PROFIT α SGrowth ε ,i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i i
where age is firm age, RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity, PROFIT is return on assets (EBIT/Assets), and SGrowth is one-year
sales growth. Using these variables, MLDA provides maximum separation between the groups. A benefit that MLDA and Dickinson
(2011) has over RE/TE is that it explicitly classifies firms into a lifecycle stage. In contrast, RE/TE provides no objective cut-off point
to delineate between lifecycle stages. The MLDA overcomes some of the problems inherent in the Dickinson (2011) approach and
hence is expected to yield a more accurate method of allocating firms to a lifecycle stage.8 Thus, MLDA is our preferred lifecycle
indicator and is our main reference point.
Finally, and for completeness, we use firm age. Many papers have suggested that firm age is an imperfect lifecycle proxy. Rather
than increase monotonically with maturity, the ‘firm age-maturity’ relationship is inverted u-shaped; by definition, new firms are
young in age but are also more likely to fail meaning that young firms can occupy the introduction and decline lifecycle stages. The
time required for firms to reach maturity varies across industries. An old firm is not necessarily a mature firm and similarly, a young
firm may not be a growth firm. We use age plus industry- and size-adjusted age. Black et al. (2014) is our source for firm age and we
follow Faff et al. (2016) in adjusting firm age by industry and size to account for cross-sectional age differences across industries and
firm size. We implement the adjustments by, first, assigning firms to an industry based on 2-digit SIC codes. Second, for each industry,
we sort firms into size-based quintiles. Then, age is regressed on industry and size dummies and we calculate the industry- and size-
adjusted firm age as the percentile rank of the residual from this age regression. Von Eije and Megginson (2008) suggest that firm age
measures calendar age while RE/TE captures ‘financial age’.
2.2. Other variables
From Worldscope, we source a full list of Korean firms, both dead and alive, over the period from 1996 to 2004. Our sample
stops in 2004 because we use the Black et al. (2014) corporate governance scores which are only available over this period. We
exclude firms in the financial and utility industries and firms with negative total equity, missing retained equity, and missing
control variables. Once we exclude firms with missing TE and RE, all firms have non-negative RE. Our final sample of firms is
described in Table 1. There are 435 individual firms, providing 1810 firm-year observations. The vast majority (86%) of firms are in
manufacturing, 124 belong to a Chaebol (business group) and 18 are cross-listed in the United States. Of the 435 firms, 48 remain in
the sample throughout, while 32 are in the sample for just a single-year. The number of firm-year observations peaks at 335 in
2001.
We measure dividend payout using dividends-to-sales, dividends-to-assets, and ‘payer’. Dividends-to-sales (assets) are measured
as total common dividends scaled by total sales (assets). ‘Payer’ is a binary dummy variable which equals one if the firm pays a
dividend in year t and zero otherwise. It is common in empirical studies of dividend payout to control for firm-specific determinants
7 See Appendix 1 for these eight cash flow combinations.
8 Faff et al. (2016, pp. 98) provide a number of arguments as to why MLDA is a superior lifecycle classification system.
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of this policy, and we control for firms' growth opportunities, corporate governance, total equity (as opposed to retained equity), firm
size, cash holdings, profitability, asset tangibility, leverage, and cash flow uncertainty.
We use market-to-book of assets (MBA) to control for growth opportunities. Adam and Goyal (2008) show that a firm's investment
opportunity set is best proxied by MBA. We calculate the rank decile MBA on an annual basis based on a 3-year average (including the
current year).9 La Porta et al. (2000) show that dividends can be an outcome of, or substitute for, governance and hence we include
the corporate governance scores of Black et al. (2014) in our analysis. Following DeAngelo et al. (2006), we include both RE/TE and
the ratio of total equity to total assets (TE/TA) in our regressions to distinguish the impact of total equity financing (TE) from the
composition of equity financing (RE/TE). They find that dividend payout is positively related to both retained and total equity and
hence both the composition (RE/TE) and size (TE/TA) of total equity influences dividend payout. Firm size is the rank decile of assets
(in dividends-to-sales regressions) and rank decile of sales (in dividends-to-assets regressions). Cash holdings is cash to assets,
profitability is measured as operating income (EBIT) to book assets, asset tangibility is gross property plant and equipment (PPE) to
assets, leverage is captured by total debt to book assets, and following Chay and Suh (2009), cash flow uncertainty is measured as the
standard deviation of operating income to total assets over the most recent four years. Furthermore, we include a ‘Chaebol’ dummy
Table 1
Sample and lifecycle descriptions.
This table summarizes our sample of firms. We report the number of firms by industry, the number of firm-year observations in total and for each year, and the
number of firm-year observations by the number of firms. Industry is based on local Korea Republic industry codes mapped to U.S. 2-digit SIC. Financial and utility
firms are excluded. Crosslist (Chaebol) refers to the number of firm-years in which firms are cross-listed in the United States of any cross-listing type (belong to a
business group). The sample period is 1998–2004. Panel B reports the number of firm-year observations in each lifecycle stage and Panel C reports whether firms
belong in one or multiple lifecycle stages over the sample period using multiclass linear discriminant analysis (MLDA), Dickinson (2011), and RE/TE lifecycle. The
Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-out/decline. RE/TE lifecycle
groups firm-years into one of three lifecycle stages, namely young, mature, and old. Panel D reports median RE/TE, RE/TA, firm age, MBA decile for each MLDA
lifecycle stage. Panel D also reports the percentage of firms that are in the same lifecycle stage according to MLDA and Dickinson (2011).
Panel A: Number of observations by industry, year, firm, and firm-type
Industry # firms Year # obs # obs # firms Firm type # obs
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2 1998 151 1 32 Chaebol 124
Mining 2 1999 182 2 52 Crosslist 18
Construction 27 2000 320 3 82
Manufacturing 373 2001 335 4 76
Wholesale trade 20 2002 261 5 82
Retail trade 7 2003 282 6 63
Services 4 2004 279 7 48
435 1810 435
Panel B: number of firm-years in each lifecycle stage and the number of lifecycle stages by firm
RE/TE lifecycle Dickinson (2011) Multiclass Linear Discriminant Analysis (MLDA)
Young 453 Introduction 152 Introduction 506
Mature 905 Growth 412 Growth 193
Old 452 Mature 760 Mature 681
Shake-out/decline 486 Shake-out/decline 430
1810 1810 1810
Panel C: number of lifecycle stages by firm
RE/TE lifecycle Dickinson (2011) Multiclass Linear Discriminant Analysis (MLDA)
1 stage 228 1 stage 83 1 stage 179
2 stages 188 2 stages 168 2 stages 165
3 stages 19 3 stages 134 3 stages 76
4 stages 50 4 stages 15
435 435 435
Panel D: Relationship between lifecycle proxies and MBA by MLDA lifecycle stage
Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline
RE/TE 0.17 0.32 0.58 0.25
RE/TA 0.06 0.15 0.34 0.11
Dickinson (2011) 13.44% 24.35% 50.66% 24.88%
Age 28 32 35 45
MBA decile 5 6 7 4
9 Gan et al. (2013) capture the “reputation-building” effect using the rank decile of sales growth (using a 5-year median). We use three as opposed to five years to
reduce the attrition rate in our sample.
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which is one if the firm belongs to a business group and zero otherwise. There is little consensus on the payout policies of Chaebol and
non-Chaebol (independent) firms. Gul and Kealey (1999) find no difference in dividend payout between the two groups, while Hwang
et al. (2013) conclude that dividends paid by Chaebol firms are lower than independent firms. In all regressions, we include a full set
of industry and time dummies. Appendix 2 describes all variables and presents summary statistics for our sample of firms.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the number of firm-year observations in each lifecycle stage according to MLDA, Dickinson (2011), and
RE/TE lifecycle, while Panel C of Table 1 reports the mobility of firms across the lifecycle stages. We follow Owen and Yawson (2010)
and partition firms into one of three lifecycle stages, namely young, mature, and old, using RE/TE (what we term RE/TE LC). Young
(old) firms are the group of firms in the lowest (highest) RE/TE quartile. All other firms are classified as mature. Using MLDA, there are
more firm-year observations in the introduction (506) and mature (681) stages than in growth and shake-out/decline lifecycle stages
(193 in growth-stages and 430 in shake-out/decline-stages). Firms display considerable movement across lifecycle stages. 15 firms
occupy all four lifecycle stages; 76 (165) occupy 3 (Aivazian et al., 2003) stages, while 179 firms remain in a single lifecycle stage.
Based on Dickinson's classification, the number of firm-years is 152, 412, 760, and 486 in the introduction, growth, mature, and shake-
out/decline stages, respectively. Similar to MLDA, we observe a strong propensity to transit across states with 50 firms appearing in all
four stages over the sample period. Only 83 firms remain in one lifecycle stage throughout, with all the others displaying some mobility
across the lifecycle spectrum. Some firms exhibit a simple lifecycle progression from birth to decline, but many do not. It is not
uncommon to see firms move back along the lifecycle (e.g. mature stage followed by growth stage), or skip a stage altogether. Miller
and Friesen (1984) observe similar lifecycle dynamics in their five-stage lifecycle model. Using RE/TE LC, the number of firm-years is
453, 905, and 452 in the young, mature, and old lifecycle stages, respectively, but the tendency to move across lifecycle stages is much
less pronounced. There are 228 firms who occupy a single lifecycle stage and just 19 who occupy all three stages.
Using MLDA as a benchmark, Panel D compares the lifecycle classifications. As expected, the median RE/TE and RE/TA increase
as firms progress along their lifecycles, peaking during the mature stage before declining again during the shake-out/decline phase.
For the Dickinson measure, we present the percentage of overlapping firm-years with the MLDA classification and we find that the
degree of overlap is relatively low. For example, only 13.44% of firm-years belong to both the introduction stage according to MLDA
and Dickinson. The corresponding figures for growth, mature and shake-out/decline stages are 24.35%, 50.66% and 24.88%, re-
spectively. Interestingly, it is mature, and not growth firms which score highest in terms of growth opportunities. Firm age increases
monotonically as firms mature. However, if we separate shake-out from decline firms, we observe the inverted u-shaped relation
between firm age and lifecycle as anticipated.
Table 2 investigates if there is any preliminary evidence consistent with reputation building. Panels A and B classify firms by
growth opportunity quartiles and present median dividend payouts for each. Panel A shows a strong positive relationship between
growth opportunities and dividend payout, consistent with reputation building. Firms in the highest MBA quartile pay the largest
dividends. Panel B shows that the transition of firms across MBA quartiles is associated with increasing dividend payouts. The largest
increases are observed for firms transitioning from quartile 3 to 4.
3. Discussion of results
3.1. Preliminary analysis
Table 3 groups firms into lifecycle stages using each of our four-lifecycle proxies. RE/TE LC allocates firms across three lifecycle
Table 2
Dividend payout and growth opportunities.
This table reports dividend payouts by level of growth opportunities for a sample of 435 Korea Republic firms over the period from 1998–2004. Growth oppor-
tunities are measured using market-to-book of assets (MBA). Dividend payout is measured using dividends-to-sales (%) and dividends-to-assets (%), as indicated. Panel
A reports median dividend payout by MBA quartile. Panel B reports the level and percentage change in median dividend payout when firms transition across MBA
quartiles. The number of transitions are reported in parentheses. Date‘t’ is the transition year. %Δ is the percentage change in median dividend payout between dates t-
1 and t.
Panel A: Dividend payout by MBA quartile
MBA quartile 1 MBA quartile 2 MBA quartile 3 MBA quartile 4
Div-sales (%) 0.29 0.50 0.51 0.79
Div-assets (%) 0.21 0.51 0.52 0.79
Panel B: Change in dividend payout by transitions in MBA quartiles
MBA quartile 1 to 2
(68)
MBA quartile 2 to 3
(63)
MBA quartile 3 to 4
(59)
t-1 t %Δ t-1 t %Δ t-1 t %Δ
Div-sales (%) 0.42 0.46 9.52 0.33 0.42 27.27 0.45 0.78 73.33
Div-assets (%) 0.34 0.45 32.35 0.39 0.50 28.21 0.48 0.71 47.92
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stages; namely young, mature and old. MLDA and Dickinson use four stages (introduction, growth, mature and shake-out/decline).
Using firm age, we create age quartiles. Dividend payout is proxied using dividends-to-sales (%), and dividends-to-assets (%). MLDA,
Dickinson, and RE/TE present a consistent story for the relationship between lifecycle stage and dividend payout policy. Dividend
payout increases as firms mature, and mature/old firms pay the largest dividends of all firms. MLDA and Dickinson agree on the
nature of the dividend-lifecycle relationship, although the differences in dividend payouts between lifecycle stages is more pro-
nounced using the former. For example, using dividends-to-sales, the median growth firm pays almost the same dividend amount in
both classification schemes. However, the median mature firm's dividend payout is 0.89 under MLDA, yet just 0.62 under Dickinson.
The bottom rows of Table 3 indicate that dividend payouts fall as firms' age.
In Table 4 we show how dividends change for firms who transition between lifecycle stages. We focus on transitions from
introduction to growth and growth to mature (old using RE/TE) lifecycle stages, and present transitions from quartiles 1 to 2, 2 to 3,
and 3 to 4, using firm age. The number of transition firms is reported in parentheses. In general, dividend payouts increase as firms
advance along their lifecycle. The size of the dividend changes differs by transition type. Under MLDA, the largest increase in
dividend payouts occurs when firms transition from the introduction to the growth stage. Interestingly, growth firms continue to
increase dividends once they mature. Classifying firms according to Dickinson and RE/TE, the largest change in dividend payouts is
observed when young/growth firms reach the mature stage. However, since growth firms always pay larger dividends once they
mature, the analysis presented in Tables 3 and 4 present a version of the lifecycle model of dividends whereby mature firms pay larger
dividends than growth firms, irrespective of the lifecycle measure employed.
3.2. Regression based tests of the lifecycle model of dividends
We estimate dividend payout regressions for the dividend amount (Eq. (1)) and the likelihood of a firm paying a dividend (Eq.
(2)). The equations are specified as follows:
= + − + + + +Div α α LIFE CYCLE βControls Year Industry eit 1 2 it it t i it (1)
= = + − + + +Prob(Payer 1) F(α α LIFE CYCLE βControls Year Industryit 1 2 it it t i (2)
The dividend amount equations are estimated using ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered by firms (Petersen,
2009), while the payer specification is estimated using logistic regression methods. Each regression contains a full set of firm,
industry and time controls. We include the MBA decile in our regressions to capture reputation-building and not lifecycle effects per
se, even though finance theory implies that MBA falls as firms mature.10
Table 5 presents our coefficient estimates from estimating Eq. (1) using dividends-to-sales (%) and dividends-to-assets (%). We
estimate Eq. (1) separately for each of our lifecycle proxies. The estimated coefficient for RE/TE (and RE/TA, unreported) is positive
Table 3
Dividend payout in each lifecycle stage.
This table reports median dividend payout by lifecycle stage. Lifecycle is proxied using multiclass linear discriminant analysis (MLDA), Dickinson (2011), RE/TE,
and firm age. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-asset (%) or dividends-to-sales (%), as indicated. In Panel A, firms are classified into three lifecycle stages, namely
young, mature, and old using RE/TE. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature,
and shakeout/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages,
namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-out/decline. In Panel D, firms are classified by firm age quartile.
Panel A: Dividend payout and lifecycle using RE/TE lifecycle stages
Young Mature Old
Div-sales (%) 0.00 0.56 0.82
Div-assets (%) 0.00 0.53 0.82
Panel B: Dividend payout and lifecycle using Dickinson (2011) lifecycle stages
Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline
Div-sales (%) 0.39 0.46 0.62 0.28
Div-assets (%) 0.37 0.44 0.54 0.26
Panel C: Dividend payout and lifecycle using MLDA lifecycle stages
Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline
Div-sales (%) 0.12 0.45 0.89 0.35
Div-assets (%) 0.09 0.48 0.92 0.27
Panel D: Dividend payout and lifecycle using age quartiles
Age quartile 1 Age quartile 2 Age quartile 3 Age quartile 4
Div-sales (%) 0.58 0.55 0.40 0.40
Div-assets (%) 0.63 0.52 0.38 0.33
10 A concern is RE/TE may be correlated with MBA and other variables capturing lifecycle effects. However, in our sample, the correlations between these variables
are small (e.g. the correlation between RE/TE and MBA is just 0.13) which may explain why MBA and RE/TE are simultaneously statistically significant in our tests.
One-year sales growth is not included in our regressions as sales growth and MBA are highly correlated.
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and significant which is consistent with the lifecycle hypothesis proposed by DeAngelo et al. (2006). The same pattern emerges when
we use RE/TE LC, since we observe that firms in later lifecycle stages pay larger dividends. Simultaneously, the coefficient on TE/TA
is positive and highly significant, which suggests that both total equity (TE/TA) and the retained proportion of total equity (RE/TE)
matter for the dividend amount. These same dividend-lifecycle patterns emerge when we use MLDA, and to a lesser extent Dickinson,
to proxy for lifecycle. RE/TE is excluded where lifecycle is proxied using MLDA because MLDA uses RE/TE to allocate firms to
lifecycle stages. Table 5 also reports results for pairwise tests for differences in dividend payout policy across lifecycle stages. Using
MLDA, the dividend payouts of mature firms are always statistically significantly larger than firms in the other lifecycle stages. Only,
this classification procedure allows us to statistically distinguish between the dividends of mature and growth firms.
Using Dickinson, mature firms pay larger dividends (as a percentage of assets) than introduction and growth firms, although the
differences in dividend payouts between the lifecycle stages are much lower than those recorded for the MLDA classification. Finally,
the estimated coefficient for firm age is negative and statistically significant, implying that dividend payouts fall as firms' age. When
we classify firms using either Dickinson or firm age and include RE/TE as a regressor, it retains its statistical significance. This finding
suggests that the RE/TE variable may not be capturing all of the lifecycle effect or possibly it may be capturing a different effect.
As well as being statistically significant, these results are also economically significant and reveal large changes in dividends
between lifecycle stages. Holding everything else constant, a one-standard deviation change in RE/TE (0.32) (which is approximately
the difference in RE/TE between introduction and mature stage firms using RE/TE LC) changes dividends-to-sales by 0.13 or 17% of
average dividend-to-sales. According to our results for the RE/TE LC classification, mature and old firms pay dividends which are,
respectively, 1.91 and 2.30 times those paid by young firms. Dividends paid by old stage firms are approximately 1.2 times larger
than dividends paid by mature stage firms or 14% of average dividends-to-sales. Using MLDA to classify firms to a lifecycle stage we
seem similar patterns. Growth- and mature-stage firms pay dividends which are 1.19 and 1.61 times dividends paid by introduction-
stage firms. The difference in the dividend payouts of mature and growth stage firms is economically large and meaningful, with the
dividends of mature stage firms being 0.18 (0.21) larger than those paid by growth firms, which is 24% (31%) of average dividends-
to-sales (dividends-to-assets). The other classification systems, Dickinson and firm age, produce smaller differences but nonetheless,
are economically significant. For example, using Dickinson, the difference between the dividends of mature and growth firms is 11%
of average dividends-to-assets. The principal message that we can distil from these estimated coefficients is that the dividend payouts
of mature stage firms are both statistically and economically larger than those of early-stage firms; two lifecycle stages where one
might expect firms to use large dividends to build reputation capital.
Going beyond the lifecycle measure, we find that the estimated coefficient on the MBA decile variable is positive and statistically
significant using dividends-to-sales and dividends-to-assets. This implies that firms with abundant growth opportunities pay large
Table 4
Lifecycle transitions and change in dividend payout.
This table reports median dividend payout as firms' transition across lifecycle stages. Date‘t’ is the transition year. Lifecycle is proxied using multiclass linear
discriminant analysis (MLDA), Dickinson (2011), RE/TE, and firm age. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-to-assets (%), as indicated. In
Panel A, firms are classified into three lifecycle stages, namely young, mature, and old using RE/TE. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. In Panel B, firms are
classified into lifecycle stages using Dickinson (2011). Panel C uses MLDA. In Panel D, firms are classified by firm age quartile. The number of transitions is reported in
parentheses. %Δ is the percentage change in median dividend payout between dates t-1 and t.
Panel A: RE/TE quartile transitions and change in dividend payout
Young to mature
(41)
Mature to old
(26)
t-1 t %Δ t-1 t %Δ
Div-sales (%) 0.20 0.49 145.0 0.60 0.79 31.7
Div-assets (%) 0.13 0.38 192.3 0.63 0.77 22.2
Panel B: Dickinson (2011) lifecycle transitions and change in dividend payout
Introduction to growth
(14)
Growth to mature
(74)
t-1 t %Δ t-1 t %Δ
Div-sales (%) 0.32 0.29 (9.4) 0.43 0.45 4.7
Div-assets (%) 0.37 0.43 16.2 0.38 0.49 28.9
Panel C: MLDA lifecycle transitions and change in dividend payout
Introduction to growth
(39)
Growth to mature
(44)
t-1 t %Δ t-1 t %Δ
Div-sales (%) 0.18 0.36 100.0 0.55 0.66 20.0
Div-assets (%) 0.22 0.43 95.5 0.47 0.80 70.2
Panel D: Age quartile transitions and change in dividend payout
Age quartile 1 to 2
(48)
Age quartile 2 to 3
(41)
Age quartile 3 to 4
(38)
t-1 t %Δ t-1 t %Δ t-1 t %Δ
Div-sales (%) 0.28 0.60 114.3 0.40 0.48 20.0 0.36 0.43 19.4
Div-assets (%) 0.23 0.70 204.3 0.35 0.47 34.3 0.25 0.37 48.0
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dividends to build reputation and foster trust and strong bonds with external stakeholders and is consistent with results in Aivazian
et al. (2003) for their sample of emerging market firms. Few of the control variables are statistically significant. The relationship
between corporate governance and dividends is positive lending support to the agency outcome model of dividends. Cash flow
uncertainty is negatively related to payout. As in Hwang et al. (2013), we find that Chaebol firms pay smaller dividends than non-
business group firms. Leverage and cash holdings are statistically significant determinants of dividend payout, only in the MLDA
specification alone where MBA decile, firm size, RE/TE, and TE/TA are excluded. None of the other control variables appear to
influence dividend payout policy.
Table 6 presents the marginal effects from the logit regression (Eq. (2)).11 RE/TE (and RE/TA, unreported) is always positive and
a statistically significant determinant of the decision to pay a dividend. RE/TE LC confirms these findings by showing that mature
firms are more likely to pay a dividend when compared to young firms (but not old firms). Different patterns emerge using MLDA and
Dickinson. The former suggests that from growth through shake-out/decline, there is no statistical difference in the propensity to pay
Table 5
Regression estimates of the dividend-lifecycle relationship.
This table reports pooled ordinary least squares estimates for the full sample of firms. The sample period is 1998 to 2004. The dependent variable is dividend payout.
Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-to-assets (%), as indicated. The standard errors are clustered by firm. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to
total equity. RE/TE LC classifies firms as young (bottom quartile), mature (second and third quartile), or old (top quartile), using RE/TE. MLDA classifies firms into one
of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach
groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-out/decline. Firm age is size and industry adjusted. Corporate
governance is from Black et al. (2014). All other variables are defined in the text. Firm-growth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the
rank decile of the average market-to-book of assets based on the previous three years. All regressions include an intercept term, industry and time dummies but are not
reported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Lifecycle measure
RE/TE RE/TE LC MLDA Dickinson (2011) Firm age
Dependent variable is div-sales (%)
RE/TE 0.401*** (4.49) 0.410*** (4.61) 0.405*** (4.59)
Growth 0.081*** (1.22) −0.000 (0.00)
Mature 0.246*** (4.83) 0.261*** (3.48) 0.024 (0.45)
Shake-out/decline 0.037 (0.66) 0.061 (1.12)
Old 0.351*** (4.37)
Firm age −0.0001*** (2.54)
MBA decile 0.069*** (6.80) 0.070*** (6.83) 0.070*** (6.83) 0.064*** (6.43)
Corporate governance 0.007** (2.05) 0.007* (1.90) 0.013*** (3.33) 0.007** (2.02) 0.008** (2.16)
Chaebol dummy −0.098 (1.33) −0.103 (1.38) −0.117 (1.50) −0.095 (1.29) −0.112 (1.54)
Size decile 0.020 (1.38) 0.021 (1.49) −0.013 (0.94) 0.019 (1.35) 0.021 (1.46)
Cash/assets 0.432 (1.07) 0.497 (1.24) 1.182** (2.57) 0.447 (1.11) 0.332 (0.80)
Profitability 0.171 (0.40) 0.091 (0.21) 0.191 (0.45) 0.090 (0.21)
TE/TA 2.123*** (8.37) 1.970*** (7.57) 2.108*** (8.42) 2.187*** (8.67)
Leverage 0.182 (0.82) 0.108 (0.48) −1.476*** (6.62) 0.192 (0.86) 0.190 (0.87)
PPE/assets 0.055 (0.31) 0.052 (0.29) 0.195 (1.10) 0.064 (0.37) 0.047 (0.27)
Cash flow uncertainty −1.064*** (4.45) −0.962*** (4.01) −1.192*** (4.83) −1.083*** (4.50) −1.038*** (4.28)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included
# observations 1810 1810 1810 1810 1810
R-squared 0.343 0.343 0.240 0.344 0.349
Growth vs. mature **
Mature vs. shake-out/decline ***
Dependent variable is div-assets (%)
RE/TE 0.329*** (4.26) 0.342*** (4.47) 0.334*** (4.40)
Growth 0.138** (2.41) −0.063 (1.33)
Mature 0.209*** (4.63) 0.346*** (5.69) 0.013 (0.27)
Shake-out/decline −0.010 (0.20) 0.021 (0.45)
Old 0.314*** (4.43)
Firm age −0.0001*** (3.21)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included Included
# observations 1810 1810 1810 1810 1810
R-squared 0.343 0.380 0.279 0.344 0.349
Growth vs. mature *** *
Growth vs. shake-out/decline *** **
Mature vs. shake-out/decline ***
11 As a robustness test, we follow DeAngelo et al. (2006) and include an indicator variable which is 1 if the firm paid a dividend in the previous year. Estimated
coefficients for RE/TE and RE/TA are reduced, sometimes by more than half, but they always remain statistically significant. Other variables are unaffected by its
inclusion. Coefficients on the lagged dividend variable are always positive, consistent with the stylized fact that dividends tend to be sticky.
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a dividend; and while the latter has a similar finding for growth and mature firms, it finds that firms in the shake-out/decline stage
pay significantly lower dividends than earlier-stage firms.
The estimated coefficient on the MBA decile variable which is positive and statistically significant using the dividend amount,
loses statistical significance in the dividend payer regressions. This implies that firms with relatively large growth opportunities are
no more likely to pay dividends but when they do, they tend to be larger. In the payer regressions, size, profitability, cash-flow
uncertainty, and to a lesser extent TE/TA, are consistent and reliable determinants of dividend payout, implying that larger firms with
stable cash flows (profits) pay dividends.12
In Tables 7 and 8 we explore in detail the influence of growth opportunities (MBA) on dividend payouts, and in particular on the
dividend-lifecycle relationship. In Table 7 we estimate Eq. (1) separately for each MLDA lifecycle stage and assess the influence of the
MBA decile variable on dividend payouts in each lifecycle stage. In the bottom rows of Table 7, we report the proportion of the total
explained variation in dividend payouts attributable to each variable. Interestingly while we find that our growth opportunities proxy
is a statistically significant determinant of dividend payout in all four lifecycle stages, it exerts its largest influence in the mature
lifecycle stage, with growth opportunities explaining almost one third of the total variation in dividend payouts. For firms in the
growth stage, the corresponding figure is 20%. Only TE/TA is more important than growth opportunities in explaining the variation
in dividend payout in the growth and mature lifecycle stage. These findings suggest that firms with relatively large growth oppor-
tunities use dividends to build reputation capital regardless of lifecycle stage, and reputation building is not restricted to firms in the
‘growth’ lifecycle stage.
We explore this issue further by estimating separate dividend-lifecycle regressions for firms with above- and below-median
growth opportunities (MBA). If reputation building through dividends is predominantly practiced by early-stage firms, then we might
expect the differential in dividend payouts between mature and growth firms to be smaller for the group of firms with large growth
opportunities compared to those with low growth opportunities, and relative to the whole sample. Table 8 reports our results and the
observed pattern does not support this hypothesis. Irrespective of the level of growth opportunities, mature firms always pay larger
dividends than firms in the introduction stage and, using dividends-to-assets, they also pay larger dividends than growth firms. The
Table 6
Payer regression estimates of the dividend-lifecycle relationship.
This table reports marginal effects from a series of logit regressions for the full sample of firms. The sample period is 1998 to 2004. The dependent variable is div-
payer, which is 1 if the firm pays a dividend in time t, zero otherwise. The standard errors are clustered by firm. The marginal effects are evaluated at the means of each
variable. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. RE/TE LC classifies firms as young (bottom quartile), mature (second and third quartile), or old (top quartile),
using RE/TE. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant
analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-out/decline.
Firm age is size and industry adjusted. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014). All other variables are defined in the text. Firm-growth is proxied using the
market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-to-book of assets based on the previous three years. All regressions include an
intercept term, industry and time dummies but they are not reported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable is div-payer
Lifecycle measure
RE/TE RE/TE LC MLDA Dickinson (2011) Firm age
RE/TE 0.335*** (10.57) 0.321*** (7.09) 0.334*** (8.22)
Growth 0.115*** (8.03) 0.010 (0.35)
Mature 0.148*** (6.48) 0.204*** (8.44) 0.008 (0.41)
Shake-out/decline 0.064*** (4.47) −0.056* (1.95)
Old 0.149*** (7.21)
Firm age 0.000 (0.86)
MBA decile −0.002 (0.86) −0.002 (0.78) −0.004 (1.29) −0.002 (0.74)
Corporate governance 0.002 (1.45) 0.001 (1.20) 0.001 (1.10) 0.002 (1.56) 0.001 (1.43)
Chaebol dummy 0.009 (0.50) 0.001 (0.06) 0.003 (0.12) 0.008 (0.44) 0.011 (0.59)
Size decile 0.011*** (2.95) 0.014*** (3.25) 0.011*** (2.25) 0.011*** (2.76) 0.011*** (2.84)
Cash/assets 0.076 (0.68) 0.143 (1.10) 0.383*** (3.18) 0.060 (0.54) 0.085 (0.77)
Profitability 1.169*** (4.46) 1.362*** (4.77) 1.099*** (3.98) 1.165*** (4.20)
TE/TA 0.295*** (4.05) 0.317*** (3.85) 0.312*** (3.93) 0.288*** (3.79)
Leverage −0.093 (1.33) −0.132* (1.65) −0.381*** (5.23) −0.086 (1.21) −0.093 (1.35)
PPE/assets −0.013 (0.27) −0.014 (0.24) 0.041 (0.70) −0.027 (0.53) −0.014 (0.29)
Cash flow uncertainty −0.816*** (3.81) −0.863*** (3.44) −1.131*** (2.78) −0.780*** (3.77) −0.817*** (3.64)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included
# observations 1810 1810 1810 1810 1810
R-squared 0.378 0.402 0.306 0.379 0.386
Growth vs. mature
Growth vs. shake-out/decline ***
Mature vs. shake-out/decline ***
12 Appendix 3 presents results of robustness checks, which show that our dividend-lifecycle tests are robust to different MLDA specifications.
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difference in dividend payouts between mature and growth stage firms is quantitatively the same across both sub-samples, 25.37%
and 25.97% of average dividends-to-assets for above- and below median MBA firms respectively.
The key implication of these results, presented in Tables 7 and 8, is that reputation building serves to maintain, and not reduce,
the difference in dividend payouts that exists between firms in growth and mature lifecycle stages. The predictions of the lifecycle
model of dividends continue to hold in this relatively low-disclosure regime because all firms, not just early-stage firms, engage in
reputation building through dividend policy to earn the trust and confidence of external investors.
4. Conclusion
We analyze the influence of reputation building on the dividend-lifecycle relationship in a low-disclosure regime where firms
have strong incentives to implement confidence building corporate policies aimed at overcoming country-level obstacles to external
investment. Since DeAngelo et al. (2006), scaled measures of retained equity, RE/TE and RE/TA, have been widely used as firm
lifecycle indicators in the literature. However, this result is based on a sample of U.S. firms. Supporting international evidence from
Denis and Osobov (2008) also comes from developed financial markets with high-disclosure requirements and strong investor
protection. Here, we focus on the dividend payout-lifecycle relationship for Korea during a period when Korea became financial
liberalization and gradually removed all barriers to foreign investment. To better understand the evolution of dividends in a relatively
low-disclosure environment, we utilise, not only the aforementioned RE/TE lifecycle indicator, but a range of such indicators drawn
from the extant literature, such as firm age, Dickinson (2011) and the MLDA methodology of Faff et al. (2016).
Table 7
The determinants of dividend payout in each MLDA lifecycle stage.
This table reports separate pooled ordinary least squares estimates for each lifecycle stage. The sample period is 1998 to 2004. The dependent variable is dividends-
to-sales (%). The standard errors are clustered by firm. Lifecycle stages are determined using multiclass linear discriminant analysis (MLDA). MLDA classifies firms into
one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total
equity. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014). Firm-growth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average
market-to-book of assets based on the previous three years. All other variables are defined in the text. All regressions include an intercept term, industry and time
dummies but are not reported. The bottom panel outlines the amount of the variation in dividend payout explained by each right hand side variable as a percentage of
the variation in dividend payout explained by the right hand side variables as a whole. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Dependent variable is div-sales (%)
Lifecycle stage according to MLDA
Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline
MBA decile 0.033*** (2.96) 0.089*** (3.79) 0.109*** (5.50) 0.051*** (3.05)
RE/TE 0.660*** (5.75) 0.476*** (2.16) 0.408* (1.79) 0.149 (0.99)
Corporate governance 0.004 (1.10) −0.010 (1.36) 0.014** (2.08) 0.006 (1.10)
Chaebol dummy −0.079 (0.90) −0.088 (0.61) −0.137 (0.94) −0.175 (1.58)
Size decile 0.040*** (2.64) 0.038* (1.66) −0.013 (0.44) 0.021 (0.84)
Cash/assets 0.398 (0.82) −0.186 (0.21) −0.003 (0.01) 2.480*** (2.85)
Profitability 0.008 (0.02) −5.403* (1.69) −0.376 (0.34) 5.928*** (4.02)
TE/TA 1.770*** (5.52) 2.430*** (5.16) 3.182*** (6.37) 1.470*** (3.54)
Leverage −0.120 (0.55) −0.034 (0.07) 0.780 (1.58) −0.262 (0.64)
PPE/assets 0.240 (1.47) 0.126 (0.32) −0.077 (0.20) 0.321 (0.97)
Cash flow uncertainty −0.170 (0.38) −1.885*** (2.74) −0.597 (1.33) −1.139*** (2.98)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included
Time dummies Included Included Included Included
# observations 506 193 681 430
R-squared 0.284 0.336 0.329 0.306
Median MBA decile 5 6 7 4
Analysis of variance (ANOVA)
Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline
MBA decile 6.31 20.28 32.82 13.41
RE/TE 39.05 7.13 4.05 1.21
Corporate governance 0.76 3.12 5.77 1.61
Chaebol dummy 0.70 0.54 1.14 3.50
Size decile 5.18 2.87 0.30 1.19
Cash/assets 0.67 0.09 0.00 25.94
Profitability 0.00 3.65 0.10 18.05
TE/TA 37.12 32.19 41.69 17.27
Leverage 0.18 0.01 1.87 0.47
PPE/assets 1.20 0.15 0.04 1.66
Cash flow uncertainty 0.10 17.17 0.94 6.03
Industry dummies 3.37 4.77 5.82 3.77
Time dummies 5.36 8.03 5.47 5.88
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Focusing on the lifecycle model of dividends, the different classification methods tell a broadly similar story and are supportive of
the model. Dividends increase across the lifecycle spectrum, peaking in the mature stage before falling in the final shakeout/decline
stage. Dividend changes between lifecycle stages are large and economically significant, particularly for the transition from growth-
to mature-stage firms. However, reputation building also plays a significant role in determining the size of dividend payouts. Contrary
to the premise underlying the adoption of RE/TE as a lifecycle indicator, we find that dividends are positively related to growth
opportunities, implying that firms use dividend policy to reassure investors and thereby build reputation to overcome country-level
institutional barriers to investment. Furthermore, the largest growth of dividends is observed for firms transitioning from the third to
the fourth quartile of growth opportunities. Partitioning the sample into firms with above- and below-median growth opportunities
(MBA), confirms this finding with the relatively higher growth group paying higher dividends and the differential between the
dividend payouts of mature- and growth-stage firms persisting between groups. Therefore, it appears that reputation building is a
motive for paying larger dividends for firms across all lifecycle stages and not solely associated with early-stage firms.
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Appendix
Appendix 1
Dickinson (2011) lifecycle cash flow patterns classification scheme.
Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of five lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity,
shake-out, and decline. Each lifecycle stage is determined by the combined signs on net cash flow from operating, investing, and
financing activities. There are eight different net cash flow permutations.
Net cash flow and predicted sign: Intro Growth Mature Shake-out Decline
NCF from operating activities − + + − + + − −
NCF from investing activities − − − − + + + +
NCF from financing activities + + − − + − + −
Table 8
The lifecycle model of dividends by level of growth opportunities.
This table examines the lifecycle model of dividends for firms with high MBA (above-median) and low MBA (below-median). Firm-growth is proxied using the
market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-to-book of assets based on the previous three years. Panel A reports median
dividend payout in each lifecycle stage by level of firm growth. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-to-assets (%), as indicated. Lifecycle
stages are determined using multiclass linear discriminant analysis (MLDA). MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and
shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. Panel B reports separate pooled ordinary least squares estimates for firms classified as high (above-
median) or low (below-median) MBA. The sample period is 1998 to 2004. The standard errors are clustered by firm. All regressions include an intercept term, control
variables, industry and time dummies but are not reported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dividend payouts in each MLDA lifecycle stage by level of growth opportunities
High MBA Low MBA
Div-sales (%) Div-assets (%) Div-sales (%) Div-assets (%)
Introduction 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.10
Growth 0.59 0.65 0.31 0.31
Mature 1.16 1.16 0.66 0.66
Shake-out/decline 0.31 0.29 0.37 0.27
Panel B: Regression based tests of the dividend-lifecycle model by level of growth opportunities
Dependent variable is div-sales (%) Dependent variable is div-assets (%)
High MBA Low MBA High MBA Low MBA
Growth 0.102 (1.06) 0.026 (0.29) 0.199** (2.29) 0.041 (0.68)
Mature 0.261*** (2.34) 0.169** (2.00) 0.369*** (3.88) 0.215*** (3.34)
Shake-out/decline 0.117 (1.43) 0.070 (1.04) 0.083 (1.17) 0.012 (0.26)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included
Time dummies Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included
# observations 904 906 904 906
R-squared 0.298 0.140 0.334 0.195
Growth vs. mature * **
Growth vs. shake-out/decline
Mature vs. shake-out/decline *** ***
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Appendix 2
Variable descriptions.
Variable Description Source Mean Median Std.
dev
Min Max
Dividends-
to-assets
(%)
Total common dividends to total assets Worldscope 0.67 0.45 0.77 0.00 4.09
Dividends-
to-sales
(%)
Total common dividends to net sales Worldscope 0.74 0.48 0.89 0.00 4.52
Payer 1 if the firm pays a dividend in year t, 0 otherwise Worldscope 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
MBA Three-year average market to book value of assets Worldscope 0.66 0.45 0.69 0.09 6.35
RE/TE Retained equity to total equity Worldscope 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.00 4.74
RE/TA Retained equity to book assets Worldscope 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.83
MLDA
lifecycle
Lifecycle measure using multiclass linear discriminant
analysis
Worldscope n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m.
Dickinson
(2011)
lifecycle
Dickinson (2011) lifecycle measure Worldscope n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m.
Age Age of firm: year less establishment year plus 1 Black et al.
(2014)
35.05 34.00 13.04 1 107
Corporate
govern-
ance
Corporate governance index Black et al.
(2014)
34.40 32.95 10.58 0.00 84.59
TE/TA Ratio of total equity to book assets Worldscope 0.48 0.47 0.19 (0.04) 0.88
Size Size rank decile using book assets (in div-sales and
governance regressions) and sales (in div-assets regressions)
Worldscope n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m.
Cash/assets Ratio of cash to book assets Worldscope 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.64
Profitability Ratio of earnings before interest and taxation to book assets Worldscope 0.03 0.03 0.06 (0.41) 0.24
Leverage Ratio of total debt to book assets Worldscope 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.00 0.76
PPE/assets Ratio of property plant and equipment (PPE) to book assets Worldscope 0.41 0.41 0.17 0.00 0.86
Chaebol
dummy
1 if the firm belongs to business group in year t, 0 otherwise Black et al.
(2014)
0.31 0.00 0.46 0 1
Cash flow
uncer-
tainty
Standard deviation of (operating income/total assets) over
the most recent four years
Worldscope 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.00 1.29
Industry
Dummies
Industry codes mapped to US 2-digit SIC codes Worldscope n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m.
Lifecycle descriptors for Dickinson (2011) and MLDA:
Sales growth One-year sales growth Worldscope 0.08 0.08 0.12 (0.36) 0.50
NCFO Net cash flows from operating activities Worldscope 0.06 0.06 0.09 (0.63) 0.69
NCFI Net cash flows from investing activities Worldscope 0.04 0.04 0.11 (2.52) 0.55
NCFF Net cash flows from financing activities Worldscope (0.02) (0.02) 0.10 (1.45) 0.46
Appendix 3
The dividend-lifecycle relationship using alternative MLDA specifications. This table reports regression based tests of the lifecycle model of dividends using alternative
Multiclass Linear Discriminant Analysis (MLDA) specifications. MLDA2 uses sales growth and profitability; MLDA3 uses sales growth, profitability, and RE/TE; MLDA4
uses sales growth, profitability, RE/TE, and size; MLDA5 uses sales growth, profitability, RE/TE, age, and size. Panel A reports the number of firms in each lifecycle
stage and the percentage of overlapping firms in each lifecycle stage according to MLDA and Dickinson (2011, DK). 1810 firm-year observations are included in each
regression.
Panel A: Comparison between Dickinson (2011) lifecycle and alternative MLDA lifecycle specifications
Lifecycle stage
Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline
Dickinson (2011) 152 412 760 486
MLDA2 364 332 639 475
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% same as DK (2011) 34.87 25.24 46.97 31.89
MLDA3 389 370 561 490
% same as DK (2011) 40.79 29.13 42.11 32.51
MLDA4 378 405 553 474
% same as DK (2011) 48.68 33.50 42.63 33.95
MLDA5 414 398 550 448
% same as DK (2011) 47.37 32.28 42.11 31.28
Panel B: Regression based tests of the dividend-lifecycle model using alternative MLDA specifications
Dependent variable is div-sales (%)
MLDA2 MLDA3 MLDA4 MLDA5
Growth 0.030 (0.61) 0.216*** (2.90) 0.214*** (3.32) 0.096 (1.41)
Mature 0.160** (2.14) 0.363*** (5.02) 0.372*** (5.05) 0.226*** (2.93)
Shake-out/decline 0.106** (2.15) 0.199*** (4.12) 0.223*** (4.39) 0.042 (0.74)
RE/TE 0.425*** (4.63)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included
R-Squared 0.308 0.246 0.247 0.237
Growth vs. mature ** * ** *
Growth vs. shake-out/decline *
Mature vs. shake-out/decline ** ** **
Dependent variable is div-assets (%)
Growth 0.102** (2.50) 0.254*** (4.66) 0.211*** (4.02) 0.106* (1.93)
Mature 0.350*** (5.98) 0.502*** (8.43) 0.485*** (7.84) 0.326*** (5.22)
Shake-out/decline 0.096*** (2.67) 0.147*** (4.13) 0.189*** (4.61) 0.000 (0.01)
RE/TE 0.338*** (4.33)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included
R-squared 0.331 0.294 0.291 0.276
Growth vs. mature *** *** *** ***
Growth vs. shake-out/decline * *
Mature vs. shake-out/decline *** *** *** ***
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